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Abstract
While the majority of the literature on secondary markets for tickets in the entertainment
industry focuses on concerts and sporting events, this study aims to shed light specifically
on the music festival resale market. Music festivals have risen in prominence in recent
years, particularly among millennials, during the time that the internet has dramatically
facilitated the resale of tickets through online marketplaces. With many of the top
festivals selling out rapidly, a great deal of music fans turn to secondary markets for
tickets. However, very little is known about the behavior of secondary markets for music
festivals due to information not being readily available to the public. This study uses
demand-side data including transaction prices and quantities acquired from one of the
largest online secondary ticket marketplaces to examine market behavior. My findings
show that on average, prices decline for music festivals as they approach, but that there
are years for certain festivals where this isn’t the case. Other results show that markets for
festivals with multiple weekends operate differently and that special artist performances
such as band reunions can have a significant positive effect on consumer demand. Lastly,
the majority of all ticket sales are found to take place in the final 30 days before music
festivals transpire.
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Introduction
Rapid sellouts for music festivals are increasingly common. Some of the most
well-known festivals like Lollapalooza sellout within hours of tickets going on sale,
reflecting a massive demand for tickets that leaves many people empty handed (Marotti,
2015). The live music industry’s expansion has been fueled in part by rising attendance at
festivals, as 32 million Americans attended at least one of the United States’ 800 music
festivals in 2014 (Nielsen, 2015). Festivals are most frequented by millennials (age 1834) which, according to a survey by the research firm Nielsen Music (2016), spend nearly
twice as much money on music festivals as the overall population. Music fans are also
highly dedicated to attending festivals, as the same report found that the average distance
traveled to a festival was 903 miles (Nielsen, 2016).
The evolution of technology has played an instrumental role in contributing to the
growth of live music events by allowing consumers to discover more artists. Streaming
services are growing rapidly, as the number of streams increased by 93% from only 2014
to 2015 (Nielsen, 2015). Streaming shifts consumer spending away from purchasing
albums and exposes them to upcoming bands because they can listen to unlimited
amounts of music, which draws more interest to large festival lineups. Social media has
also become a large component of festival popularity due to festival attendees eagerly
sharing their experiences with friends through their social networks. The economic
importance of festivals has also expanded as sponsors funnel millions into branding
initiatives, local communities benefit from tourism revenue, artists receive larger
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paychecks and fans receive good value for their money in terms of the number of artists
they see and stage production quality (Reddy, 2014).
The growth in demand for popular music festivals has led to an active secondary
market for tickets. The internet’s largest contribution in this regard is that it has made it
simple to connect buyers and sellers through digital marketplaces. Individuals resell
festival tickets online for a myriad of reasons. Some purchase tickets in the initial sale
craze to simply make quick arbitrage profits once tickets sell out, while others sell their
tickets because they simply may no longer attend the festival. Regardless of the motives
behind a sale, buyers in this market have very little information to go off of. Online
marketplaces only display the prices for tickets at the moment customers log onto their
websites. Some websites are more progressive, like the ticket aggregator “SeatGeek” that
allows users to set price alerts for certain events, but it still is not open access to
information that would be helpful when making purchasing decisions.
Due to the differing natures of concerts and music festivals, their resale markets
may behave in different manners and this thesis will address this issue. I will first
examine the underlying literature for secondary ticket markets in the entertainment
industry in order to lay a theoretical framework from which to approach the festival ticket
secondary market. Next, an overview of the data and discussion of price trends will
follow. Finally, a regression analysis will test for variables that may be influencing prices
in order to predict price trends we may expect in future years.
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Literature Review
A. The Market
Before diving into the secondary market, it will be helpful to understand how
concert tickets are sold in the music business. Artists are represented by agents, who
negotiate with promoters and venues to coordinate performances. Artists oftentimes
include ticket prices in their negotiation with promoters, who also handle marketing and
general logistics for the events.1 In the case of music festivals, tickets are priced solely by
festival promoters and artists have no influence on prices. Tickets are then sold through
online ticket agencies such as Ticketmaster, and this is what is officially known as the
“primary market.” Sometimes, tickets are withheld for managers, news media, record
companies or fan clubs for exclusive sales or giveaways. Ticket agencies merely act as
mediums that facilitate a transaction and exert no influence on pricing decisions.
The “secondary market” refers to all transactions involving a ticket after its sale in
the primary market and is supplied by consumers, brokers and scalpers. Brokers are a
more sophisticated version of scalpers that operate as businesses, buying large amounts
of tickets with the sole intent of reselling them for a profit. Before the widespread use of
the internet, brokers would hire people with credit cards to buy tickets over the phone or
have them stand in line to buy tickets at booths. Scalpers still operate without a license on
a much smaller scale, usually selling tickets outside the events themselves on the day-of
the performance. Lastly, consumers sell tickets because their circumstances change and
they may no longer be able to attend an event. It’s possible for them to end up making a

1

See Courty (2000) and Krueger (2004) for a more thorough overview.

MUSIC FESTIVALS

9

profit on the sale depending on the market conditions, but they do not make the initial
purchase with aspirations for profit; otherwise, they would be scalpers.
More recently, the secondary market was revolutionized and grew dramatically in
scale due to the internet (Bhave & Budish, 2014). Websites such as eBay, Vivid Seats
and StubHub are leading online marketplaces where individuals can list their tickets for
sale. These developments have made the secondary market extremely open to the public
and easily accessible to anyone after a quick search. Online ticket marketplaces provide
their services in exchange for a percentage of ticket sales. This evolution in the market
has eliminated the need for brokers to spend money on marketing and has instead shifted
this job to the marketplaces themselves.
Overall, the internet has decreased the costs of acquiring tickets in the primary
market and selling them in the secondary market. The obvious benefit of resale is that it
allows fans to easily sell tickets if a conflict prevents them from attending the event. The
unintended effect is that resale has exacerbated rent seeking by speculators and brokers
who now enjoy economies of scale and no longer face the geographical boundaries and
labor requirements of resale in the pre-internet era (Bhave & Budish, 2014). Estimates in
2011 by Ticketmaster state that 20% of all tickets bought in the primary market are later
sold in the secondary market. A report from an e-commerce research company named
Forrester Research by Mulpuru, Hult and Johnson (2007) estimated the secondary market
to be worth $4.5bn by 2012, experiencing an annual average growth rate of 12% from
2008-2012.
While extensive literature on primary ticket markets currently exists, the same
cannot be said for secondary markets. Most of the research focuses on tickets for sporting
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events, with some looking at concerts and none so far, to the best of my knowledge,
focusing solely on music festivals. A reason behind the lack of research stems from the
difficulties of measuring the secondary market because of its informal nature. A lastminute ticket sale from one person to a friend, or by scalpers that stand outside of venues
the day-of concerts, for example, would leave no trace anywhere. Before the rise of
online ticket marketplaces, the only real way to attain information on the secondary
market was to stand outside a concert and interview people about where they got their
tickets. One study by Krueger (2004) in fact did this very thing. Yet this method would
be too taxing and limited in amassing significant data, and fortunately, isn’t necessary
anymore.
Now that major online marketplaces sell thousands of tickets per day, electronic
records of these transactions are created and stored, which can provide researchers with
crucial data to analyze. This transaction information is not open to the public and
consumers, but has been released to certain academics and government entities for
research. But first, let us examine why secondary markets exist at all.
B. Underpricing
The secondary market is a perplexing phenomenon to classical economists
because it indicates that tickets are not being sold at the market clearing level. If
promoters notice over time that shows for a certain performer consistently sell out
quickly and many tickets are later resold above face-value, why don’t they raise prices?
After all, scalping in the secondary market does not benefit artists, promoters or venues;
that extra money flows from fans to independent third parties. The CEO of Ticketmaster,
Terry Barnes, recently stated that "we're in an industry that prices its product worse than
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anybody else" (Smith & Silver, 2006). Yet, the literature shows that there may be other
motives and long term strategies behind ticket prices other than single-event profit
maximization by promoters and artists, which leads to ticket underpricing.
A social component is likely to play a significant role in the underpricing of
tickets. When looking at the food industry, the Nobel Prize winner Gary Becker argued
that popular restaurants don’t raise prices even when lines are long because customers
place a higher value on a good or service they feel is highly sought after. In addition, the
very nature of eating at a restaurant is a social event, which in turn signifies that customer
demand is positively correlated (Becker, 1991). These principles may well apply to music
festivals and concerts, since a music event’s experience and consequently value is
enhanced by a fuller crowd, and decreased if the floor is empty (Courty, 2003).
Courty (2000) also notes that a common motive for underpricing is that it
guarantees a sellout, which has an added positive value for marketing purposes. Other
studies have found that the underpricing of IPO’s leads to larger media attention, news
coverage and website traffic, which is consistent with this theory (Demers & Lewellen,
2003; Bradley, Kim & Krigman, 2015). Most festivals offer “Early Bird” tickets which
are sold ahead of the general sale at a discounted price. These tickets sell out close to a
hundred percent of the time within hours of going on sale, and undoubtedly lead to media
coverage they otherwise would not have received at that point in time. Lastly, Bernoulli’s
hypothesis implies that tickets will tend to be set below the market clearing price due to
the higher value connected to avoiding a loss over attaining a gain (Europe Economics,
2009). The uncertainty over sales leads to an inclination to underprice rather than risk
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overpricing and undergoing its potentially disastrous effects, since festivals need to cover
a very high base of fixed costs (Courty, 2003).
The sale of complementary goods may also be factored into ticket prices as part of
a profit maximization strategy, leading to the perception that they are mistakenly
underpriced. Krueger (2004) hypothesizes that artists were incentivized to underprice
tickets because a larger audience would translate into more record sales, leading to higher
profits over time. However, he states that due to the internet, consumers can now gain
access to music without purchasing records, diminishing the strength of this link. Without
considering record sales though, the complement theory may still hold ground as it relates
to the sale of food, beverages and merchandise. In an analysis of ticket pricing for the
major American basketball, football, baseball, and hockey leagues, Krautmann and Berri
(2007) found that owners routinely priced tickets in the inelastic range of demand. When
marginal costs were close to zero, lower ticket prices, discounted by as much as 56% for
baseball, were revenue-maximizing due to non-ticket revenues increasing significantly.
This may be the case as well for major festivals, since the majority span across three days
and profit largely off of sales of these types of complementary goods, justifying lower
ticket prices. In addition, they have high fixed costs and very low marginal costs—factors
which are consistent with this theory.
Although it may not be initially apparent, underpricing tickets may also achieve
profit maximizing goals in the long-run. Krueger (2004) explains that for experience
goods, the price of the goods is a key part of the experience and important for customer
satisfaction. A music festival is concerned about the longevity of its business and aims to
fulfill its audience by not exploiting them, in turn assuring that they will return for
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subsequent years. This makes intuitive sense as charging market clearing prices may
result in resentment by consumers and a deterring factor for future attendance. Europe
Economics (2009) explains that underpricing is “optimal if it fosters customers’ loyalty
and helps to guarantee a stream of future revenues” (p. 9). The long run view is especially
important for music festivals because they occur on a yearly basis and foster a
predictable, ongoing relationship with consumers, unlike individual artists that may not
go on tour every year.
Following the theme of long term profits, perhaps the most important
consideration of all surrounding underpricing is an underlying agreement of fairness
between consumers and suppliers. Central to this is that fans of sports teams and music
artists do not act like rational agents. In a free market, fairness should be a meaningless
factor in determining prices, yet music fans hold suppliers up to their expectations of
fairness (Krueger, 2001). In popular music, non-traditional economic concerns and
emotion are large factors and these social elements must be taken into account (Krueger
& Connolly, 2006). The emotional component causes consumers to view music festivals
through the lens of a meaningful social event, not a simple economic transaction, which
leads them to expect fairness on behalf of the supplier.
In a recent study exploring the effects of attending music festivals, Ballantyne &
Packer (2014) found that engagement at festivals provides a medium for people to
“connect with the arts and so discover a sense of identity, meaning and social integration”
(p. 66). They also found that festivals provide an escape from everyday life which can
make attendees view life differently and expand their openness to positive influences.
Due to the highly personal, positive aspects of festivals and music’s inherent emotional
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connection to people, it is understandable why consumers for music festivals do not
behave as rational agents.
In terms of how fairness translates to prices, Kahnemanm, Knetsch, and Thaler
(1986) found that customers place major importance on being treated fairly and the
market clearing price may indeed feel unfair to many. Additionally, consumers only
found it fair to raise prices when an increase in costs was incurred, but not because of
excess demand or monopoly power. A prime example of these findings is the case of
Ultra Music Festival (UMF), one of the leading electronic music festivals in North
America.
In 2014, UMF suddenly raised its General Admission ticket price to an all-time
high of $399 (approx. $500 after fees and shipping) from 2013’s cost of $299 (approx.
$375 after fees and shipping.) This price hike caused outrage in the electronic music
community and even led to the launch of the Facebook campaign “Boycott Ultra Music
Festival” by over 6,000 fans (Pajot, 2014). That year, tickets did not sell out until the last
day before the festival began, an extremely rare occurrence, and the Ultra brand suffered
heavy criticism from its longtime supporters. The following year, Ultra responded
through an official statement announcing that “For the first time in its history, and as a
thank you to its loyal legion of fans, Ultra Music Festival is reducing the price of General
Admission tickets” (Sachs, 2014). Prices were reduced by approximately $50 to a price
of $449.95 inclusive of fees. This example clearly demonstrates the influence consumers
can exert on festival organizers and is consistent with the literature on the value placed on
fairness.
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It is also clear that fairness does not only exist because of expectations and
enormous pressure from fans, but from artists’ legitimate desires to be fair to their fans.
One example is Bruce Springsteen, who consistently sells tickets for far below their
market value as evidenced by rapid tour sellouts reflecting excess demand (Krueger,
2004). The massively popular folk rock band Mumford and Sons, in a recent outcry
against ticket scalping, stated that “we’ve worked so hard over the years to keep our
ticket prices reasonable – we want all of our fans to be able to come to our shows” and
“we want fans of the band to be able to get into our shows for the right price, to feel that
they’ve got value for money” (Marshall, Mumford, Dwayne, Lovett, & Tudhope, 2015).
Although festival organizers do not represent specific artists, they undoubtedly have
similar intentions aligned with treating fans fairly. One piece of evidence is the fact that
festivals such as Coachella and Austin City Limits have recently grown their events to
cover two weekends instead of just one in an effort to gain profits by increasing supply
rather than by raising prices. There is no doubt that the underpricing of tickets is a
complex matter and is an important element to incorporate in the analysis of the
secondary market.
C. Social Welfare
From a purely theoretical standpoint, the secondary market serves a positive
function for society because it allows for a more efficient allocation of tickets from low
to high value consumers (Leslie & Sorensen, 2013). Even if a ticket is sold for much
more than face value, both parties’ wellbeing must be improved as a transaction between
two willing parties would not have taken place otherwise (Europe Economics, 2009). The
secondary market corrects for inefficiencies in the primary market and in doing so, raises
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the overall social welfare. Online intermediaries play a very important role because they
greatly reduce the transaction costs of time spent searching for a buyer and determining
the proper market value.
In practice, this theory may not necessarily be the whole story. Leslie &
Sorensen’s (2013) study matched ticket sale data they received from Ticketmaster to
sales on the leading online marketplaces eBay and StubHub for 56 rock concerts. They
created a model where consumers and brokers’ expectations of the secondary market
were reflected in their decisions in the primary market. They found that under conditions
of frictionless resale, ticket resellers enjoyed a significant increase in surplus, whereas the
average surplus of concertgoers decreased by 17%. The aggregate surplus did increase,
which theoretically is a positive outcome, but “the biggest losers from resale are the
consumers who actually attend the event” (p. 269). Surplus improved for primary market
sellers because the presence of brokers led to more sales on average, but the question
remains of whether promoters care more about this extra surplus for personal gain, or
instead transferring it to consumers, which is being undermined by brokers.
A primary motive behind these findings may lie in the fixed price market design
of tickets. Krueger (2001) characterizes it as inefficient because tickets don’t go to the
highest value customers, taxes can be evaded by sellers and the risk of counterfeit tickets
is high. He suggests an open auction online as the solution to these problems, with the
added benefit of establishing a market price for legitimate tickets. The auction would
ensure that tickets go to those willing to pay the most, and therefore allowing for the most
efficient distribution of tickets.
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Several years later, Bhave & Budish (2014) conducted a study that looked at the
effect of auction based ticket sale design for the music industry. Ticketmaster in fact
offers its customers the option to sell tickets through auctions, but only a small
percentage of the best seats tend to be chosen for auction sale by clients, if any at all.
Bhave & Budish used data on tickets that were sold by auction for 22 concert tours and
matched them to sales for nearly identical tickets on eBay. Their study had two major
findings: performer revenue approximately doubled under auction sales and arbitrage
profits from underpricing disappeared, leading to an almost entire reduction in resale
profits for brokers. They concluded that “bad market design can induce socially wasteful
rent-seeking behavior on the way to the ultimate allocation” (p. 19).
D. Market Trends
At the moment, there are not any significant data available for consumers to make
informed decisions in the secondary market. When customers access online marketplaces
such as StubHub or Viagogo, they can only see current prices and how many tickets are
for sale. They have no way of seeing the recent movement in prices or what trends have
been in previous years on similar dates. The only way they can track this information is
by logging into these marketplaces every day and recording the listed prices, which is
highly unlikely to be feasible for most consumers. Important questions, such as when is
the best time to purchase tickets for an event is, remain largely unanswered. However,
some of the literature may shed light on general trends we may expect in the market.
Sweeting (2008) analyzed the resale market for Major League Baseball games
and found that prices fell substantially as games approached. He attributes this tendency
to the fact that tickets are perishable goods and as theoretical models would predict,
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sellers lower prices over time because future sale opportunities shrink. Sweeting also
noted that a portion of buyers purchased tickets long before the event date even though
they knew prices would fall, indicating a level of risk aversion or higher valuation for
some. The tendency for prices to fall over time, the declining price anomaly, has also
been found in studies on auctions for wine and art (Ashenfelter, 1989). Sweeting’s (2008)
findings differed from studies in other markets such as the airline industry, where prices
tend to increase as the flight approaches. The key difference between these markets is
that tickets for airlines can’t be resold. Therefore, airline companies are able to capture
the extra rent from consumers that become aware of their demand later on, unlike music
festival promoters (Courty, 2003).
Courty (2003) presents a model for the market where there are two types of
consumers. The first purchase tickets very early on, while the others have to wait until
closer to the event to find out if they will be able to attend it. In equilibrium, brokers
purchase tickets in the primary market early on and sell them later to the second type of
customer. The second type of consumers realize their demand closer to the date, and
therefore pay a higher price since they value the ticket more. However, when Krueger
(2004) surveyed fans at a Bruce Springsteen concert, he found that the prices did not
increase as the concert approached as Courty’s model would’ve predicted—instead they
fell. Another inconsistency with Courty’s model was found by the consultancy firm
Europe Economics (2009) when they surveyed a group of online ticket marketplaces.
Multiple respondents indicated that secondary market sales close to the primary sale date
were likely to be by professional resellers, while later sales were mostly consumer driven.
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While Courty’s model has not been consistent with other findings, it is possible
that it may hold for the music festival market. Most major festivals span out over three
days which requires a higher level of commitment, planning and likely time off work in
comparison to attending a concert, for example. In addition, many festivals are not
located in major cities, requiring attendees to find lodging nearby or camp on-site if
available. Therefore, it is feasible that many people fall into Courty’s classification of the
second type of consumer because they cannot plan so far in advance, and end up paying
more for tickets once they realize their demand. The following analysis in this paper aims
to shed light on how these theories apply to the secondary market for festivals.
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Empirical Analysis
A. Data & Descriptive Statistics
Data on the secondary market is difficult to come by and not openly accessible to
the public. Approximately twenty online marketplaces were contacted with requests for
data on music festival ticket sales and all but two declined or did not respond. The
marketplace “TickPick” was able to provide data for three festivals, but it was an
insufficient amount of data. Fortunately, “TicketCity” was generous enough to grant me
access to their ticketing data website, which tracks all sales of tickets on one of the top
five online ticket secondary marketplaces. Due to a non-disclosure agreement, the name
of the marketplace from where the data originates cannot be disclosed. However, the
marketplace can certainly provide a general overview of major trends due to its size and
significant presence in the market.
Data for individual transactions were available for three years from 2013-2015,
which included the sale date, section, price and quantity of tickets for each transaction.
Data were extracted for all of the most popular American music festivals, defined as
those having a total sales volume over the time period in excess of $500,000. Fourteen
unique festivals met this condition for being part of the data set and are displayed in
Table 1 on the following page. The abbreviations column indicates the name with which
festivals will be referred to for the rest of this paper. Table 1 clearly shows that there is a
good variety in both locations around the United States and genres represented by these
festivals.

Official Name

Abbreviation Location

Music Genres

Coachella Valley Music and Arts Festival

Coachella

Indio, CA

Rock, Indie, Hip Hop, Electronic

Ultra Music Festival (Miami)

Ultra

Miami, FL

Electronic

Electric Daisy Carnival (Las Vegas)

EDC Vegas

Las Vegas, NV

Electronic

Lollapalooza (Chicago)

--

Chicago, IL

Rock, Pop, Hip Hop, Electronic

Bonnaroo Music and Arts Festival

Bonnaroo

Manchester, TN

Pop, Rock, R&B, Reggae, Hip Hop

Austin City Limits Music Festival

Austin City Limits

Austin, TX

Rock, Indie, Country, Folk, Electronic

Electric Forest Festival

Electric Forest

Rothbury, MI

Electronic

Firefly Music Festival

Firefly

Dover, DE

Rock, Hip Hop, Electronic

Outside Lands Music and Arts Festival

Outside Lands

San Francisco, CA

Indie, Rock, Hip Hop, Electronic

Burning Man

--

Black Rock Desert, NV

Electronic

Sasquatch! Music Festival

Sasquatch

George, WA

Rock, Experimental, Electronic, Hip Hop

Stagecoach Festival

Stagecoach

Indio, CA

Country

Budweiser Made in America Festival

Made in America

Philadelphia, PA

Hip Hop, Indie, Experimental, Pop, R&B

Governors Ball Music Festival

Governors Ball

New York City, NY

Hip Hop, Pop, Electronic, Experimental

Table 1: Description of the festivals in the data set.
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Tickets for festivals tend to be sold in two categories, General Admission (GA)
and the more expensive Very Important Person (VIP) category. While some festivals
offer luxury tickets beyond the VIP level, the incidence of their resale was extremely low
and they were excluded from the data set. In some cases, transactions took place after a
festival began, either after the first or second day of performances. These transactions
were also excluded as this study aims to understand the market trends leading up to the
event, not during it. A fraction of the festivals sell tickets for individual days which were
not included as the majority only offer “3-Day Passes” and will be the focus of this
analysis. Note that the festivals Made in America and Burning Man do not offer VIP
tickets, and VIP sales for Firefly were under ten in total and therefore not included.
Daily Avg.
Price

Standard
Deviation

# Tickets Sold

Sales Volume

2013

$333

124.4

38,522

$11,945,375

2014

$390

178.8

27,684

$10,333,654

2015

$393

159.0

43,051

$15,860,358

GA Average

$370

154.9

109,257

$38,139,387

2013

$879

312.1

2,067

$1,753,089

2014

$968

396.8

2,214

$2,185,387

2015

$909

311.8

2,890

$2,738,455

VIP Average

$915

338.8

7,171

$6,676,931

Festival Year
GA

VIP

Table 2: General overview of the by ticket type and year.

The mean of the daily average price for tickets was calculated for each festival by
category, which is denoted as the “Daily Avg. Price” in Table 1 above. From this point
onwards, the term daily average price refers to the mean of daily average prices. The total
number of tickets were recorded and the “Sales Volume” represents the dollar value of all
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sales in the given period. “Festival Year” indicates the year in which the festival took
place, not necessarily the year in which all tickets were sold. For example, tickets for
Coachella’s 2013 edition sold in 2012 would fall under Festival Year 2013, not 2012.
The daily average price rose each year for the GA tickets, peaking at $393 in
2015. The quantity of GA tickets fell by 28.1% from 2013 to 27,684 in 2014, but then
grew to a total of 43,051 tickets in 2015 surpassing 2013’s original quantity. VIP tickets
saw growth in the number of ticket sales each year, but 2015 experienced decline in price
after increasing from 2013 to 2014. Overall, it is clear that the incidence of VIP sales is
significantly lower as they accounted for only 6.2% of all ticket sales, however, they
comprised 15% of the total value of sales. This is to be expected as the supply of VIP
tickets is significantly smaller than that of GA tickets. Additionally, VIP tickets cost
more than twice as much as GA tickets on average, meaning that there is also a smaller
consumer base able to afford them.
Philadelphia’s Made in America Festival, at two days in length, is the only one in
the fourteen festival data set to not span at least three days. In the case of Coachella and
Austin City Limits, both festivals have expanded in recent years to take place over two
consecutive weekends. They are treated as separate festivals in the data and are
differentiated by being either “Week 1” or “Week 2,” although the face value prices are
the same for both weekends. Coachella’s lineup remains the same albeit for the two
smallest stages, the Do Lab and Heineken Dome, which do not even have their artists
listed on the official lineup. Austin City Limits changes some artists in earlier time slots
as well as a few of its headliners between the weekends, but overall, both festivals mirror
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each other in most regards between weekends. See Table 2 and Table 3 below for a
general overview of GA and VIP tickets by festival.
GA Tickets
Festival

Total Sales
Volume

Daily Avg.
Price

# Tickets
Sold

Coachella Week 1
Lollapalooza
EDC Vegas
Outside Lands
Coachella Week 2
Burning Man
Austin City Limits Week 1
Ultra
Austin City Limits Week 2
Governor's Ball
Stagecoach
Bonnaroo
Electric Forest
Made in America
Firefly
Sasquatch

$6,272,886
$5,176,751
$3,695,630
$2,941,904
$2,804,261
$2,682,290
$2,395,148
$2,383,911
$2,106,606
$1,329,464
$1,287,398
$1,138,161
$1,129,938
$934,098
$930,800
$930,141
$38,139,387

$493
$344
$401
$351
$407
$745
$285
$421
$258
$259
$275
$280
$373
$152
$274
$398
$357

12,680
15,408
9,093
8,385
7,876
3,543
8,981
5,429
8,356
5,245
4,699
4,545
2,765
5,936
3,815
2,501
109,254

Grand Total

Table 3: GA ticket sales overview from 2013-2015 sorted in descending order of sales volume.

Chicago’s Lollapalooza ranked first in terms of quantity of GA tickets sold at
15,408, while Coachella Week 1 had the highest total sales volume of $6,272,886. The
daily average price over the three years was highest for Burning Man at $745, $252 more
than the next highest festival average. Burning Man had a constant face-value price of
$390 over the time period, and therefore its average price exhibits a substantial mark-up.
A likely explanation for consumers’ willingness to pay such an elevated price is that
Burning Man is eight days long, which may lead them to feel that they are still receiving
reasonable value for their money. Of the three and four day festivals, Coachella Week 1
had the highest average price at $493. Without double counting for the festivals that have
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two weekends, seven of the fourteen festivals surpassed the $2,000,000 level for sales
volume. The remaining festivals hovered around the $1,000,000 mark, the highest and
lowest being Governors Ball and Sasquatch with sales volumes of $1,329,464 and
$930,141, respectively.
VIP Tickets
Festival

Total Sales
Volume

Daily Avg.
Price

# Tickets
Sold

Coachella Week 1
Coachella Week 2
EDC Vegas
Outside Lands
Lollapalooza
Ultra
Bonnaroo
Electric Forest
Governor's Ball
Stagecoach
Sasquatch
Austin City Limits Week 1
Austin City Limits Week 2

$3,153,828
$769,221
$586,777
$451,875
$449,096
$407,238
$207,824
$153,633
$153,535
$151,286
$88,515
$57,037
$47,066
$6,676,931

$1,106
$858
$681
$793
$1,508
$1,319
$715
$809
$494
$746
$642
$901
$710
$868

2,774
1,004
879
617
309
321
286
186
316
198
149
60
72
7,171

Grand Total

Table 4: VIP ticket sales overview from 2013-2015 sorted in descending order of sales volume.
.

In contrast to GA sales, VIP tickets had a substantial gap between the top two
festivals with the highest sales volumes. Interestingly, these were the two Coachella
weekends, with the first weekend’s edition more than quadrupling the volume of the
second. Coachella Week 1’s total sales volume comprised 47% of the entire sales volume
across all the festivals, showing that it dominates the VIP market to a much greater extent
than the GA market. Lollapalooza had the highest daily average price at $1,508, while
Governor’s Ball had the lowest at $494. Ultra and Coachella Week 1 were the only other
festivals to surpass the $1,000 level for daily average price. The quantity of overall sales
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was particularly low for Austin City Limits with a combined weekend total of 132 VIP
tickets, less than the 149 tickets sold for Sasquatch, the next lowest selling festival.

B. Observed Trends
One of the major points of interest of this study is to examine how prices are
moving over time. If prices rise for the most part until the day of the event, then it would
make sense for consumers to purchase tickets as early as possible. Sweeting (2008) found
that prices tended to fall as baseball games approached, whereas Courty’s (2003) model
would suggest that prices rise as consumers that realize their demand later on enter the
market. Without previous access to sales data, consumers solely rely on their own
experiences and hearsay in determining the optimal time to purchase tickets. Figure 1
below examines sales price movements across all festivals and years combined.2 “Days
until” is used to track time, which denotes the number of days remaining until the festival
takes place. For example, a sale when days until is equal to seven would denote a
transaction one week before the event.
A reason why the variation is much larger when days until is higher is because the
sale frequency is lower and there are days for which no trades took place for some
festivals. These gaps in the data cause the daily average to vary to a greater extent
because it is being calculated for fewer average prices, which pulls the overall daily
average in the direction of festivals that had sales those days. Additionally, not all
festivals conduct their pre-sale and regular sales at the same number of days until their
events, which means that there are fewer festivals’ prices being averaged the further out
we look. At approximately 130 days until, sale frequency starts to grow as most festivals
2

Extreme outliers for the last two Days Until for 2014’s Coachella Week 1 were excluded in this analysis.
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have already held their general sales (raising market supply) and more consumers begin
to plan out their attendance, lessening the degree of variation.3
Fig. 1 GA Average Daily Price 2013-2015
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There is a slight upward trend in prices from about 300 to 175 days until, which
may be due to risk averse consumers that were not able to buy a ticket in the general sale
wanting to secure a ticket early on. They may also be willing to pay higher prices for
tickets if they need to purchase airfare and hotel accommodations to attend the festival,
which will usually be cheaper the earlier they book them. The maximum average price
was $552 at 189 days until, while the minimum was $219 at 277 days until. At 31, 7 and
1 days until, the average price was $356, $323 and $319, respectively. From about 120 to
30 days until, the average price fluctuated between the $400 and $350 range, and fell
under $350 for the remaining days after. One explanation for this movement is that
people who were planning on attending the festival have a conflict arise in the one month
3

See Figures 1-4 in the Appendix for a GA price trend for each individual festival.
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window prior to the event. They end up needing to sell their tickets hastily, but because
this occurs simultaneously for many other people, there is a surge in market supply and
people are willing to accept lower prices in fear of losing the entire face value of the
ticket. On top of this, brokers and individuals who purchased tickets with the sole intent
of reselling them for a profit realize that their opportunity to make a sale is dwindling and
that ticket prices are falling. Therefore, they also become willing to accept a lower price
and decrease the prices of their tickets.
Online marketplaces list tickets on their websites in ascending order by price, and
consumers will always purchase the cheapest ticket because there are only two
homogenous categories to choose from—GA and VIP. Due to this, it is possible that
anxious ticket vendors monitor the market closely in the the final days leading to the
event and lower their prices to appear higher on the list of available tickets, creating a
downward momentum effect. A major tour concert could possibly experience a different
effect leading up to the performance because there are many seating categories which
allow for more elaborate price discrimination. A person with a front-row ticket is likely
to not be as worried about not selling their ticket for at least face value a week from the
event as someone trying to sell the worst seat in the house.
Figure 2 and 3 on the next page plot the average price and quantity of tickets sold
together for each type of ticket. Starting at about 60 days until, we see the beginning of a
sharp rise in the average sales quantity per day for GA tickets, and it remains above
twenty tickets per day for the last 30 days. This trend in sales quantity appears to be
consistent with Courty’s (2003) model where he states that many consumers realize their
demand later on because they find out they can attend the event. The difference between

Figure 2 & 3: The scale for Quantity is on the left vertical axis, and on the right for Avg. Price
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Courty’s model and these results is that consumers who realize their demand later on do
not appear to be paying a premium on average, as his model would have predicted.
Another possible explanation could be that some consumers were planning to attend all
along and believed prices would fall as the date approached, which they did, and
therefore purchase tickets then. An important caveat to this analysis is that these data
reflect only ticket sales and transactions that took place. It does not represent what the
average market price for all listed tickets at the time was. It could be that prices are in
fact very high during these last few days for the most part, but because some people are
nervous about not selling their tickets as mentioned previously, these few price their
tickets cheaply relative to the market.
VIP tickets appear to follow a similar downward trend in price as the festivals
approach, but the changes in price are much larger in magnitude due to the higher cost of
the tickets. At 31, 7 and 1 days until, the prices for VIP tickets were $880, $775 and
$821, respectively. From about 15 to 0 days until, VIP prices steadily fluctuated around
the $800 price level. The issue of data gaps due to days with no sales for some festivals is
also a likely factor of the larger variation in price when days until is greater, as it was
with GA. Another possible factor could be that people who are purchasing VIP tickets
have a significantly less elastic demand than those attempting to purchase GA tickets and
are not as deterred by elevated ticket prices further from the event. It may not matter to
them as much to wait for ticket prices to potentially drop, and they instead purchase them
at the price listed at the given day they checked online. For example, GA passes to
Coachella in 2015 were $375, compared to $899 for VIP. This stark price difference
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suggests an important distinction between the GA and VIP demand pools’ disposable
incomes and sensitivity to price levels.
C. Weekend Comparisons
Coachella and Austin City Limits’ dual weekends present an interesting
opportunity for comparison to see if the secondary market acts similarly between the
weekends. Because these festivals are almost identical across each weekend aside from a
few changes in performers and their dates, we are able to hold most factors constant and
make inferences about consumer behavior. If a rational, surplus maximizing consumer is
able to attend either weekend, they should attend whichever one is cheaper because they
are almost the same good in theory.
An examination of both weekends of Coachella revealed that 2014 was an
irregular year for the secondary market. Prices in the last 20 days for Week 1 were
extremely high compared to 2013 and 2015, while sales in general were practically nonexistent for Week 2 in the last 100 days. Figure 4 below undoubtedly shows how there
was an enormous surge in price in the last few days of 2014. A potential explanation for
$3,000

Fig. 4 Coachella Week 1 GA 2013 - 2015
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Figure 4: Vertical axis denotes the daily average price.
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the elevated price could be that the hip hop duo OutKast was reuniting to perform live for
the first time in nearly a decade. Fans may have been willing to pay much higher
prices than usual to be the first to see OutKast’s first reunion show. What remains clear is
that 2014 was not an ordinary year for Coachella and may not reflect ordinary trends for
the festival, which can distort any form of analysis. Therefore, the 2014 edition of both
weekends of Coachella were excluded from analysis for the remainder of this section.
Fig. 5 Coachella GA 2013 & 2015
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Figure 5: All values denote daily averages.

Figure 5 above plots the average prices and quantities of tickets sold for both
weekends of Coachella in the last 105 days. From approximately 90 days until, the
average price for Week 1 and Week 2 began to diverge. The average quantity sold for
both festivals was mostly uniform throughout and shows that, unless for some reason it
happens to be that more people can only attend Week 1, consumers are generally willing
to pay a higher price for Week 1. At 3 days until, the prices for both festivals almost
converge, which may due to consumers realizing that their window of opportunity to

Quantity
Week 2
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attend is closing and are forced to purchase a ticket if they really want to go. When
looking at Weekend 1, they may feel that they still have the opportunity to go the next
week if prices don’t fall to the levels they desired, and therefore decide to wait—a luxury
not afforded to them in the second week.
Fig. 6 Austin City Limits GA 2013-2015
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Figure 6: All values denote daily averages. Gaps indicate days where there were no sales.

In general, Week 1 for Austin City Limits had a higher average price than Week
2, but to a much smaller extent than Coachella. Also, there were many instances where
Week 2 surpassed the price of Week 1, which did not occur with Coachella. Quantity also
remained rather uniform throughout, with both weeks experiencing a spike in quantity in
roughly the last ten days. There may be three possible explanations for seeing such a
large difference in price between both weekends of Coachella, and to a lesser extent,
Austin City Limits. The first is that there is higher demand simply because more people
are able to attend Week 1 owing to other conflicts, although this is likely to only apply to
a fraction of attendees. The second reason for higher prices may be due to the perceived
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notion by consumers that demand is higher for Week 1 because it is better. Like Becker’s
(1991) explanation of consumers valuing a restaurant meal more if it is highly sought
after, festival-goers may believe that Week 1 is intrinsically better than Week 2 because
of the higher overall demand—if not, why would people pay more for it? The fact that
Week 1 for Coachella sells out before Week 2 lends support to this explanation and
reflects elements of self-reinforcing expectations.
Perhaps the most likely factor behind the price difference is a basic “novelty”
principle. People may value Week 1 more because it occurs first and they are able to
experience the festival before other people are able to. Similar to this is how people will
wait overnight for the opportunity to purchase the new iPhone model first or previously,
the next Harry Potter book, even though they could wait a few days to purchase the same
good, at the same price, without the wait. Another component to this explanation is the
role played by social media. Music festivals push for social media involvement heavily
and usually embed it into their festival phone applications. Consumers who attend Week
1 earn “bragging rights” by being the first to share their experience at the festival with
friends and family through their social media networks (Zhang, 2014). By the time Week
2 comes along, people may not be as impressed or interested in social media posts from
festival-goers because they have already seen many of them from the previous week.
D. Year Comparisons
While it may be tempting to make generalizations about when the best time to buy
tickets is, there is always the possibility that other factors will disrupt the price trends we
may expect. Two such instances will be explored next with Ultra Music Festival and
Austin City Limits Week 2. In Figure 7 below, the average daily price for Ultra Music
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Festival over the three years is plotted. Even though 2013 had the lowest face value price
of $375 after fees relative to 2014 and 2015’s respective prices of $500 and $450, its
prices were the highest for the last 50 days leading up to the event. While it is not
possible to explain all of the factors behind 2013’s high prices, a large component surely
was Swedish House Mafia’s (SHM) final performance as a trio.
SHM were one of the most, if not most, popular artists in the electronic music
genre at the time and in 2012, the three members decided they would part ways the
following year. “One Last Tour” was their last tour ever together which was scheduled to
have its final show in Los Angeles on March 9th, 2013. On January 7th, 2013, Ultra Music
Festival released its lineup which contained a surprise appearance by SHM. This
announcement was made about 65 days before the festival took place, and in Figure 6
above we can see that the prices jumped upwards at about 50 days until the show. This
time gap could be reflective of time taken for this information to reach fans, as well as
fans who wanted to attend, but needed some time to figure out if attending would be
feasible or not, resulting in an overall increase in demand. The rise in price may also be

Fig. 7 Ultra GA Avg. Price 2013 - 2015
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attributed to a decrease in supply, resulting from people who intended to sell their tickets,
but then decided to attend because of SHM’s last performance ever.
The lineups were not entirely the same each year, so the overall quality of the
lineup could also be an important reason why 2013 had an elevated price. However, this
was likely not the case as prices for 2013 were lower than the other years up until 50 days
before the festival. Furthermore, the 2013 prices were practically equal to those of the
other years if we adjust for the difference in face value price, since 2014 and 2015 were
more expensive. What remains clear is that 2013 was special in that it offered a unique
opportunity to see SHM’s last performance together and may have driven prices upward
due to higher demand and a contracted supply.
Figure 8 on the following page displays the average price for Austin City Limits
Week 2, and the opposite effect was witnessed for prices in 2013. At a face value of
$225, GA tickets did not even surpass $200 in any of the 100 days leading up to the
festival. 2013 was also a special year for Austin City Limits in that it was the first year
that it expanded to two consecutive weekends, hence, doubling supply. While it isn’t
possible to determine with absolute certainty that this drop in average price was a supply
side phenomena without information on how many tickets were listed for sale online, it is
extremely likely that this was the case. If demand were to have been very low, it does not
make much sense why the festival sold out, unless many people purchased tickets with
the intent of reselling them for a profit. However, in 2014 and 2015, prices remained at or
above face value throughout, indicating that this steep price drop in 2013 had something
to do with how the public perceived the festival’s first year of expansion.
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Fig. 8 Austin City Limits Week 2 GA 2013-2015
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E. Statistical Analysis
An OLS multi-variable regression with Average Daily Price as the dependent
variable is utilized in my statistical analysis. The purpose is to determine to what extent
different observable variables may be influencing the price of tickets in online
marketplaces, which include:


Days Until: The number of days remaining until the event which aims to expose
the relationship between the proximity of the event and movements in the
market’s price levels. This variable can help identify when the ideal time to
purchase a ticket is if a significant relationship is found.



Days2: Simply the Days Until variable multiplied by itself. This is used to capture
any non-linear relationship between price and the days leading to the events. For
example, prices may not fall or increase at a consistent rate as the events
approach.



Daily Quantity: The average daily quantity of tickets sold which will test how
prices are affected by different amounts of ticket sales. If Daily Quantity is high,
it could mean a significant reduction in supply because consumers have purchased
many of the available tickets, which may be reflected by an increase in price.
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VIP: Binary variable indicating whether or not the ticket is of the VIP category.
Without it, all tickets would be equivalent in the data set and average resale prices
would be distorted as GA and VIP tickets differ substantially in face value prices.



VIP Days Until: Interactive variable of VIP and Days Until to capture if the price
for VIP passes behaves differently from GA tickets as the event approaches. This
variable reflects differences in consumer behavior and suppliers between both
ticket markets. For example, it may be the case that prices fall as the event
approaches for GA tickets, but rise for VIP tickets, which this variable will pick
up on.



VIP Quantity: Interactive variable of VIP and Daily Quantity. The same as Daily
Quantity above, except this solely captures the effect of the quantity of tickets
sold on VIP ticket prices. If this variable is not significant, then we may expect
VIP and GA tickets to react similarly to varying amounts of tickets sold.



Camping: Binary variable indicating if the festival offers camping to attendees.
Camping may draw more people to want to attend the festival, raising overall
demand and prices accordingly, or it could potentially discourage some depending
on their preferences. Another possible way it may raise demand is if many
consumers must travel to attend the festival and camping is the only way they can
afford to do so if the alternative means booking a hotel room.



VIP Camping: Interactive variable of VIP and Camping which captures how the
price for VIP tickets varies between festivals that do and do not offer camping. It
may be the case that GA attendees enjoy camping more than VIP consumers, and
therefore VIP demand is lower for festivals that offer camping, resulting in lower
prices.



Camping Days Until: Interactive variable of Days Until and Camping to measure
if the average prices for festivals with camping behave differently as the festivals
approach than for those without camping. Having camping as an option may
make it easier for consumers to make the decision to attend a festival closer to its
date, which could cause an increase in demand as the event nears. Camping could
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also have the opposite effect, as it requires a larger degree of planning out
supplies and gear than simply booking a hotel room.

All regressions were run with festival fixed effects and festival year fixed effects.
These measures were taken to control for differences such as face value price, capacity
and location between festivals, as well any differences in the overall live music market
and economy over the three year time period. As previously mentioned, there were gaps
in the data when Days Until was very large due to low sale frequency and the fact that
festivals sell their tickets at different numbers of days ahead of their events. These gaps
may lead to a non-synchronous trading problem which can bias beta estimates, as Fowler
and Rorke (1983) have found with infrequently traded stocks. Shorter time periods with
fewer Days Until will be considered to mitigate some of the non-synchronous trading
bias, as sales are more consistently observed as the event date gets closer.
Table 5 on the next page displays the correlation between the variables included
in my regressions. The correlation matrix showed no gleaming issues of multicollinearity
as there were no unusually large correlations present. While the correlation between Days
Until and Days2 was rather high at 0.9286, it was not surprising to find given that Days2
is merely Days Until squared and is exponentially proportional to its values. Two other
variables with relatively large correlations included VIP and VIP Days Until as well as
Camping and Days Camping. These two correlations are understandable as well given
that the correlation is between an interactive variable and one of its components, which
means they are likely to be related to each other. Overall, multicollinearity does not
appear to be an issue as it would bias my regressions against finding significant
coefficients which, as will be shown briefly, was not the case.
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Avg. Price Days Until Days2 Daily Quantity VIP VIP Days Until
1
-0.0552
1
-0.038
0.9286
1
-0.176
-0.3363 -0.2212
1
0.7314
-0.2254 -0.1567
-0.1847
1
0.5887
0.1034
0.0902
-0.1365
0.6377
1

VIP Quantity VIP Camping Camping Days Camping
VIP Quantity
1
VIP Camping
0.435
1
Camping
0.086
0.3659
1
Days Camping
-0.0548
0.1159
0.6773
1
Table 5: Correlation matrix of all regression variables.

Table 6 on the following page displays the results of the various regressions using
Average Daily Price as the dependent variable. Columns 1 and 2 include all days for
which sales took place, with Column 1 being the simpler version of the two without
interactive variables and Camping. The R-squared value of the regression in Column 2
indicates that 78% of the variation in the Average Daily Price is explained by my model.
Columns 3, 4 and 5 are restricted to 160, 100 and 30 Days Until to examine different
blocks of time leading up to the festivals. Note that Governors Ball was omitted in the
regressions because of collinearity and robust standard errors were used throughout to
account for potential heteroskedasticity. Lastly, the last two Days Until from the 2014
edition of Coachella Week 1 were excluded from the data set for being extreme outliers.4
Days Until was significant at the 1% level in Column 2 with a coefficient of
0.653. In fact, all variables were significant at the 1% level except Daily Quantity. Since
the coefficient of Days Until is positive, it means that prices are falling as the number of

4

See Appendix Table 1 for regression results without the exclusion of outliers.

Dependent Variable:
Average Daily Price

(1)
Full Sample

(2)
Full Sample

(3)
Days Until < 160

(4)
Days Until < 100

(5)
Days Until < 30

Days Until

1.030***
(0.0929)
-0.00284***
(0.000279)
0.118
(0.0794)

0.653***
(0.0781)
-0.00186***
(0.000277)
-0.0862
(0.0532)

0.598***
(0.177)
-0.00272**
(0.00112)
-0.136**
(0.0603)

0.796**
(0.373)
-0.00751**
(0.00340)
-0.184**
(0.0844)

-1.952
(1.639)
0.0458
(0.0540)
-0.553***
(0.127)

552.1***
(8.725)

498.8***
(13.10)
1.784***
(0.204)
1.596**
(0.774)
-112.6***
(17.35)
323.3***
(10.47)
-0.165***
(0.0554)
142.5***
(9.332)

468.4***
(13.67)
2.462***
(0.276)
2.041***
(0.759)
-107.6***
(17.02)
316.5***
(11.26)
0.0389
(0.0931)
152.7***
(9.867)

464.0***
(14.37)
2.202***
(0.344)
1.552**
(0.736)
-80.99***
(17.42)
319.2***
(13.36)
0.411**
(0.168)
151.7***
(12.37)

382.4***
(22.41)
5.896***
(1.256)
2.337***
(0.833)
-59.79***
(22.00)
389.3***
(23.12)
-0.448
(0.948)
154.4***
(19.36)

Days2
Daily Quantity
VIP
VIP Days Until
VIP Quantity
VIP Camping
Camping
Days Camping
Constant

Observations
R-squared
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414.0***
(8.692)

6,914
6,914
6,189
4,953
0.778
0.792
0.791
0.786
Table 6: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

1,970
0.753
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days to the festival decreases by $0.65 per day. This finding appears to be consistent with
the downward trend in average prices previously seen in Figure 1 and confirms that the
best time to purchase tickets is as late as possible. The statistical significance of Days2
tells us that the relationship between Average Daily Price and Days Until is not entirely
linear and has some concavity to it. In the last regression in Column 5 looking at only the
last thirty days, both of these variables became insignificant which may be due in part to
the reduced sample size of 1,970 observations.
The hypothesis behind Daily Quantity was that as the amount of tickets sold
increased, overall supply would be lower and hence prices would rise. The variable was
not significant when looking at the entire sample of days, but became significant when
the regression was restricted to fewer days in Columns 3 – 5. Its negative coefficient
implies that the average price got lower as the quantity of tickets sold increased. The
explanation behind this may be entirely the opposite of the original hypothesis in terms of
the direction of causality. It is likely the case that the quantity of tickets sold was rising
because the prices set by sellers were lower, which in turn led more consumers to decide
to purchase tickets. Regarding the insignificance of the coefficient in Column 2, we must
remember that in the days further away from the festivals in the full sample, sales were
not as frequent and price variation was much larger. Therefore, it would make sense that
there wasn’t as strong of a relationship between price and quantity.
It was expected that the VIP variable would be significant as the face value prices
between GA and VIP tickets were very large in the first place. The three VIP interactive
variables were significant at least at the 5% level across all regressions and provide
insights to the market for VIP tickets relative to GA ones. VIP Days Until also had
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positive coefficients like Days Until, albeit of larger magnitude which can be explained
by the higher overall prices of VIP tickets. In the full sample, we find that VIP tickets
decrease by $1.78 for each day the festival approaches, and by $5.89 per day when
restricting the data to the last 30 days before the festivals. This large change in the
magnitude of VIP Days Until’s coefficient may result from a less liquid market due to
there being a smaller pool of individuals able to afford the tickets in general. Sellers may
feel even more pressured than GA ticket owners to lower prices when few days remain
because they are competing for fewer customers.
The GA and VIP prices differ in regards to how they are affected by the quantities
of tickets sold and availability of camping. VIP Quantity has a positive coefficient of 1.59
in the full sample, as opposed to the negative coefficient of Daily Quantity. This means
that prices for VIP tickets increase as the number of sales escalates and is consistent with
the hypothesis that more sales lead to higher prices by reducing supply. However, it
cannot be said with certainty that this is the case. The alternate causality direction of the
relationship would suggest that consumers purchased more tickets because prices were
getting higher. This would be reasonable if consumers noticed at times that prices were
rising and decided to purchase the more expensive tickets because they feared having to
pay an even higher price later on.
The idea behind the Camping variable was to examine how the availability of
camping might affect prices. Festivals that take place within cities, like Ultra and
Lollapalooza in downtown Miami and Chicago, respectively, do not offer camping
because of obvious reasons. Festivals that do offer camping tend to be in large, open
spaces that may be somewhat far from major cities, or at least far enough for it to be
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inconvenient to travel back and forth each day. When there isn’t camping available,
attendance is relatively easy for people that happen to live nearby the festival, and more
difficult and costly for those who don’t as they need to book hotel rooms.
Festivals in the sample that did offer camping were Coachella, Electric Forest,
Firefly, Burning Man and Sasquatch. VIP Camping was significant at the 1% level in all
regressions, and its coefficient decreased in magnitude with each restriction from -112.6
in the full sample to -59.79 in the 30 day sample. In contrast, Camping was positive with
a coefficient of 323.3 in the full sample and 389.3 in the 30 day sample, all significant at
the 1% level. There are so many potential factors behind these results that it is impossible
to determine the exact causes behind them, but a few potential ones will be mentioned
next.
The negative coefficient of VIP Camping could be due to VIP consumers
preferring to stay in hotels in general, and therefore feeling inclined to pay less for tickets
because of having to cover hotel costs. It may also be the case that wealthier people are
clustered closer around city centers where festivals without camping take place, and are
willing to pay higher prices for these festivals because they don’t have to pay for lodging.
GA consumers may be willing to pay higher prices for festivals with camping because
they provide an alternative option to expensive hotels. Camping passes tend to cost about
$100 and can usually accommodate at least four people, which means that over the
course of three days, the camping cost per person is minimal. Finally, camping may
provide an added social bonus element to the overall festival experience by allowing
them to become part of a community for a few days and have more opportunities to meet
new people.

MUSIC FESTIVALS

45

The purpose of the Days Camping variable was to expose differences in average
prices as the festivals approached for those that do and do not offer camping. It could be
the case that as the festival date nears, most hotel rooms are booked or extremely
expensive at that point. Consumers might end up saving money from having the option to
camp and consequently be willing to pay higher ticket prices. It could also be that prices
fall for festivals with camping if camping passes sell out and would-be attendees need to
cover hotel costs, reducing their willingness to pay for the tickets themselves. The
regression results for Days Camping are hard to interpret because they were only
significant in Columns 2 and 4, and the coefficients switched from negative to positive.
Column 2 suggests that prices increase by $0.65 each day the event approaches, while
Column 4 proposes that prices will decrease by $0.41 each day. Due to this mixture of
results, no compelling conclusions should be drawn from this variable.

Limitations
The primary limitation of this study is the lack of information on the supply of
tickets. Data are for transactions that took place and accordingly reflect the demand side
of the market. Without information on supply, it is difficult to definitively understand
why prices move in certain directions. For example, we cannot tell if tickets got more
expensive in a certain time period because a lot of people wanted them, few people were
selling them, or a combination of the two. Additionally, this study was carried out with
data from a sole online marketplace. If future studies are able to compile data from
multiple marketplaces that include the number of tickets for sale and their prices, as well
as transactions that went through, they will gain a more accurate understanding of the
market and better grasp of its magnitude.
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A major problem in examining the secondary market is that there isn’t any way to
capture information on informal transactions that take place, which inevitably reduces the
accuracy of any analysis. The website Craigslist is immensely popular for the sale of
tickets, but doesn’t leave any records behind as it merely connects buyers and sellers
through ad postings. Online marketplaces charge a percentage fee of sales for their
services, so whenever a ticket holder is able to sell their ticket in person with relative
ease, they will opt to do so. Finally, fraudulent tickets are also part of the information
problem, as their sale is consumer demand that never gets reflected in the market. These
factors add a level of complexity to research of the secondary market and are a limitation
any future studies must consider.

Conclusion
The future of online secondary marketplaces for live music events holds a lot of
potential for growth as music festivals continue to rise in popularity among millennials.
Sales volumes for the ticket resale industry as a whole have consistently grown in recent
years while the internet has facilitated further consumption of music and ticket resale.
Social media’s increasing presence in everyday life through smartphones is also a leading
factor in growing the popularity of live music events as fans are extremely active on
social media while attending festivals.
Regression analysis has found that prices tend to decrease over time as festival
dates approach and hence consumers should wait as long as they can until purchasing
tickets from resellers. However, this trend does not apply for festivals in years when
special performances take place as was seen with Ultra 2013 and Coachella Week 1
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2014. Prices tend to fall more rapidly for VIP tickets than for GA tickets as the festivals
approach, and it appears as though VIP customers are less attracted to festivals with
camping than those without.
Overall, this paper lays a foundation for the further study of the resale market for
music festivals. Their complex nature compared to regular concerts provides many
different facets to analyze and factors to consider when attempting to understand the
market. Without supply-side data, it is difficult to explain the underlying motives for
price movements, and incorporating this data should be the main goal of future studies.
Further studies may also decide to focus on music festivals of a single genre as they may
be more easily compared and can potentially reveal how consumer behavior differs
depending on individual music tastes. Another interesting avenue for research would be
to examine how market demand evolves as consumers gain more information. If it
becomes widespread knowledge that prices tend to fall as events approach, consumers
may collectively refrain from purchasing tickets until the last moment possible, altering
current market dynamics.
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Appendix
Dependent Variable:
Average Daily Price

(1)
Full Sample

(2)
Full Sample

(3)
Days Until < 160

(4)
Days Until < 100

(5)
Days Until < 30

Days Until

0.955***
(0.100)
-0.00264***
(0.000296)
0.105
(0.0780)
551.8***
(8.952)

0.600***
(0.0828)
-0.00160***
(0.000307)
-0.100*
(0.0539)
497.4***
(13.13)
1.748***
(0.208)
1.901**
(0.857)
-109.4***
(18.26)
336.7***
(12.75)
-0.228***
(0.0646)
143.3***
(9.383)

0.410**
(0.205)
-0.00137
(0.00132)
-0.172***
(0.0645)
466.4***
(13.88)
2.422***
(0.285)
2.279***
(0.837)
-104.6***
(18.04)
334.4***
(14.69)
-0.0756
(0.110)
156.4***
(10.21)

0.333
(0.449)
-0.00287
(0.00416)
-0.260***
(0.0976)
460.7***
(14.97)
2.153***
(0.366)
1.684**
(0.798)
-77.90***
(18.85)
344.2***
(18.65)
0.187
(0.202)
160.0***
(13.51)

-5.188**
(2.351)
0.159**
(0.0784)
-0.652***
(0.153)
386.0***
(26.26)
5.338***
(1.545)
1.872**
(0.908)
-54.10**
(26.85)
466.8***
(44.83)
-2.662*
(1.445)
170.9***
(23.15)

Days2
Daily Quantity
VIP
VIP Days Until
VIP Quantity
VIP Camping
Camping
Days Camping
Constant

426.2***
(10.68)

6,918
6,918
6,193
4,957
1,974
Observations
0.761
0.774
0.771
0.763
0.711
R-squared
Table 1: Regression results including the outliers from 2014’s Coachella Week 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1 & 2: GA Average Daily Prices from 2013-2015 for multiple festivals.
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Figure 3 & 4: GA Average Daily Prices from 2013-2015 for multiple festivals.
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